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1 Introduction
One of the great things achieved by Thomas Piketty and his collaborators is to
make people reﬂect once again on what happens, or what may happen, in the
long run. The scale of the project is interesting. Robert Solow, reviewing J. K.
Galbraith's New Industrial State, remarked that Economists are determined
little thinkers (Solow 1967). Galbraith was, of course, not a little thinker;
neither is Piketty.
The Piketty research project focuses on the analysis of long-run develop-
ments of the distribution of income and of wealth (Piketty 2005; Atkinson and
Piketty 2007,2010; Alvaredo and Piketty 2010; Piketty and Saez 2014). This is
among the biggest of big questions and is closely related to other broad distri-
butional questions that have featured prominently in the literature over the last
decade or so, such as the relationship between inequality and growth (Banerjee
and Duﬂo 2003) or whether there is overall convergence or divergence in the
world income distribution (Sala-i-Martin 2006).
To better understand the contribution of Piketty (2014) to our understanding
of the forces underlying inequality we should perhaps begin by asking what is
meant by the long run.
2 The long run
Within the economics literature on inequality there is has long been an interest
in the long run. It is reﬂected in the recent interest, cited in the introduction, in
documenting income shares, income distribution and wealth distribution. How-
ever, there are diﬃculties in trying to provide a serious analysis of the long run.
Setting aside the familiar empirical problems of forecasting and of backwards
extrapolation into previous centuries, there is a problem in determining what
the long run could tell us in principle. How does the time scale of the long run
relate to the human time scale? In what way does long-run analysis connect to
practical policy making?
There is a danger in trying to force a big-picture account of how distribu-
tions develop through time into an almost uninformative mantra rather than
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conducting a compelling reasoned analysis. Here are two examples of the kind
of mantra that I have in mind, taken from popular interpretations of the work
of two important predecessors of the Piketty project.
A development mantra
A prominent example of a mantra concerning the dynamics of distributions is
the popular discussion and use of the Kuznets curve. This is taken to charac-
terise a speciﬁc pattern of income inequality through the process of economic
development (Kuznets 1955). It is based in part on an empirical claim about
the observed relationship between the level of economic development and in-
come inequality: plot the level of development (according to some metric) on
the horizontal axis and a measure of inequality on the vertical axis and you
should see an inverted-U shape. This empirical claim may be true of a collec-
tion of economies at a particular moment in time; a bolder step is to translate
this to a statement about the development of a particular economy  perhaps
a single country, perhaps the world as a whole. Then the low-high-low of the
cross-sectional relationship between measured inequality and level of develop-
ment becomes a claim about the development process  rising inequality followed
by falling inequality ( Piketty 2014, pages 13-15).1 The problem with the way in
which the Kuznets vision has sometimes been interpreted is that the inverted-U
story becomes a kind of inevitable pattern for the development of income and
wealth distributions. In my view the Kuznets process is better interpreted as a
way of posing some motivating broad questions about fundamental relationships
at a time when longitudinal data were scarce. It is usually not seen as so help-
ful nowadays in the light of the broad range of evidence that is now available
(Atkinson et al. 2011).
I want to emphasise that my reference to mantra is not an attack on
the pioneering work of Kuznets. Kuznets did not try to over-claim in his key
papers.2 Furthermore, he was careful about what one could say with the then
available data: indeed Kuznets' earlier careful work (Kuznets 1953) was a model
for the way in which Piketty and his collaborators have assembled evidence from
tax data.
A statistical mantra
It is often convenient to characterise the shape of the interpersonal distribution
of wealth or income using a statistical functional form. If there seems to be a
1In fact popular discussion of Kuznets focuses on just one of two forces mentioned in his
1955 paper. He also discusses the role of growth and the concentration of savings in a manner
that is very similar to Piketty: one can then say, in general, that the basic factor militating
against the rise in upper income shares that would be produced by the cumulative eﬀects of
concentration of savings, is the dynamism of a growing and free economic society (Kuznets
1955, page 11; see also Atkinson et al. 2011, page 57).
2Disarmingly he admits: In concluding this paper, I am acutely conscious of the meager-
ness of reliable information presented. The paper is perhaps 5 per cent empirical information
and 95 per cent speculation, some of it possibly tainted by wishful thinking. (Kuznets 1955),
page 26.
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regularity of shape across a broad collection of data sets then it is tempting to
refer to this shape as a law of distribution. Perhaps the most widely known of
these is Pareto's Law. But what is it and what is the attraction of the Pareto
analysis? The supposed law can be interpreted in several ways, some of which
could be misleading.
Pareto was responsible for some pioneering work that in some way can be
seen as similar to Piketty's research project. Using the scarce data available
at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries he postulated
that the distribution of incomes regularly conformed to a characteristic pattern
(Pareto 1896, 1965, 2001).3 Use F to denote the distribution function of wealth,
so that F (W ) means the proportion of the population with wealth less than or
equal to W . Then the characteristic shape that Pareto uncovered in his data
analysis can be summarised by
log (1− F (W )) = k − α logW,
where k and α are constants.4 In other words, if one plots the distribution of
wealth in diagram with the log of wealth W on the the horizontal axis and the
log of the proportion of the population possessing W or more on the vertical
axis, then we should get a negatively sloped straight line. The constant k (the
intercept in the equation) is not of great importance in the interpretation of
the supposed relationship; by contrast the slope  that has come to be known
as Pareto's α  has sometimes been seen as of enormous importance. Clearly
this simple formulation raises a number of questions.
First, is the shape empirically reasonable? A straight-line relationship is not
reasonable for all deﬁnitions of income and wealth over the broad mass of the
population. If one draws the associated density function, one ﬁnds a single-tailed
distribution that appears to be quite unlike the empirical income distributions
that emerge from contemporary oﬃcial statistical sources in most countries. But
Pareto was only able to observe part of the income distribution and it worked
for his data; it is still useful for some parts of the data available today. However,
although it is handy as a shortcut indicator of inequality (the lower is coeﬃcient
α, the higher is measured inequality) and although it is convenient to use as
a tool for ﬁlling in the gaps where data in the upper tail are sparse, it is not
clear that even there the Pareto functional form always works well in practice
(Cowell 2013).
Second, is there a tendency for distributions to take this particular form?
Here one is going beyond a simple description of shape, where suitability could
be determined by statistical criteria. A Pareto distribution could be the equi-
librium outcome of a particular economic process (see section 4 below for a
discussion of the meaning of this concept) but then its status as a law is
3However, he only used a proportion of the statistical evidence available from income-tax
data available at the time.
4This might more properly be termed Pareto's ﬁrst Law. The formula is for what is
formally described as a Pareto Type-1 distribution  Pareto also suggested more sophisticated
formulas for characterising income and wealth distributions (Kleiber and Kotz 2003, Cowell
2011, Appendix A).
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contingent upon whether the economic model associated with that process is
appropriate.
Third, is there some kind of social dynamic that suggests that a particular
Pareto distribution should be or ought to be the characteristic form of the dis-
tribution of income or wealth? Should one expect a particular value of α to
emerge as part of some grand social and economic process over time or ought
social planners aim at at a particular α in order to achieve some speciﬁc policy
objective?5 These types of approach do little to illuminate the forces underly-
ing wealth inequality and in some interpretations amount to little more than
statistical determinism.
Again, I want to stress that this is not an attack on Pareto's empirical
methods but on the (mis-)interpretations of Pareto. Changing a useful empir-
ical insight about the upper tail of distributions into a law does not advance
understanding.
To avoid being derailed by a mantra approach6 and to obtain a more pro-
ductive interpretation of the long run we need to examine carefully the nature
of the economic modelling underlying the income distribution and the structure
of wealth.
3 Modelling wealth
It is not hard to ﬁnd examples of economic analysis and economic models that
are unnecessarily complicated. A cynic might suggest that making it hard for
the non-technical reader to grasp the elements of an economic model is an es-
sential part of academic respectability. However, in the present case cynicism is
misplaced: the analysis of the development of wealth distributions is necessarily
complicated.
The two main reasons for the complicated nature of the problem are the
diversity of forces that bear upon the economic mechanisms involved and the
nature of time within any reasonably ﬂeshed-out economic model. Let us brieﬂy
consider these in sections 3.1 and 3.2.
3.1 Distribution mechanisms
If we want an economic theory of distribution where should we look? The
economist's instinctive response is to compartmentalise the answer into (a) the
role of the market mechanism and (b) the role of non-market mechanisms, with
a strong presumption that the emphasis be on (a).
(a) Obviously the market is central to a lot of the long-run story in that
it ultimately determines the rate of return to labour and capital, the factors
5As examples of the ﬁrst see the versions of a rather odd mathematical theory of history
to be found in Davis (1941) and Bernadelli (1944)); as an example of the second see Adams
(1976).
6Piketty (2014) discusses both of these mantras but does not get sidetracked.
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of production. furthermore, it is possible to construct fairly useful long-run
models using an extreme simpliﬁcation of the ﬁne structure of the economy.
Typically such economic models would consist of inﬁnite-lived agents who trade
with each other. Within such a framework it is easy to slip into the mindset that
the market takes care of everything. But does it? Obviously not in situations
where market failure is important  imperfect and asymmetric information,
externalities, public goods and the like. But in the context of analysing the long-
run distribution of wealth we do not need to appeal to failure of the market in
order to question the universality of the market as a distribution mechanism.
(b) If economists admit the importance of non-market mechanisms then
perhaps their thoughts next turn to government. The role of government is
obviously important in taxation and in providing and enforcing the legal and
institutional framework that underpins wealth ownership and wealth transfers.
But, arguably the government's role is secondary to another class of non-market
mechanism  voluntary transfers and inheritance.
3.2 Inheritance
Time linkages are central to the modelling of the inheritance process. It can be
thought of as a story of two chapters, each with a diﬀerent conception of time
(Champernowne and Cowell 1998):
Chapter 1: Intragenerational. Think of a lifetime as a time interval that
runs from initial age t0 to ﬁnal age t1, where t0 could be physical birth,
or an economic starting point such as entry into the labour market and
t1 could be physical death or some other key economic exit point, such as
the date of retirement; time could be thought of as ﬂowing continuously
from t0 to t1, or as passing in discrete units (years). Within the lifetime
individuals or households plan economic activity that leads to either cap-
ital accumulation or the dissipation of assets. This sets the scene for the
second chapter.
Chapter 2: Intergenerational. Think of society as as the projection through
time of a collection of dynasties, generation by generation. The sequence of
generations could be imagined as discrete-number conception of time. The
link between the generations is the inheritance process: ﬁnancial capital is
passed from generation n to generation n+1. Of course, depending on the
way in which institutions within society operate, other forms of wealth,
such as human capital, may be passed too.
Taking a snapshot of wealth at any moment in history, one sees elements drawn
from each of these two chapters. Representatives of diﬀerent dynasties who
happened to be born in diﬀerent years will be alive at the same time. So to
track the course of inequality one could look at the wealth distribution either
in terms of what the overall picture looks like in a speciﬁc year or the in terms
of the distribution among the dynasties for a given generation n.
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3.3 A meta-model
We need a simple sketch of how an economic model of the dynamics of wealth
distribution can be constructed. The potential components of a model can
conveniently be introduced using the two-chapter breakdown mentioned under
the discussion of inheritance (section 3.2).
Mainstream economics is stronger on Chapter 1 of the wealth-dynamics
story. Life-cycle models are conventionally used to explain savings behaviour;
augmenting these models to cover a bequest motive is a simple, logical way of
closing out the Chapter 1 account. Standard microeconomic modelling pro-
vides apparently reasonable answers to questions about the nature of risk taking,
entrepreneurial activity; microeconomics gives us clear answers about the forces
aﬀecting work decisions and thus about labour market outcomes that aﬀect the
wealth accumulation process during the lifetime.7
The Chapter 2 elements  linking one generation with the next  consist of a
diverse collection of of processes, social norms and institutions. A brief checklist
would surely include the following three elements.
Family formation
If the rich form marriage alliances with the rich this clearly has a tremendous im-
pact on the process of wealth concentration in the long run in contrast to social
arrangements where partnership arrangements are much more diﬀuse (Blinder
1973). But other features of the family are also crucial in terms of the potential
division or concentration of wealth during the inheritance process: the number
of children in the family and the relationship between family size and parental
wealth for example.
Bequest motive
Bequests may be consciously designed as an extension of the Chapter 1 plan-
ning process. We can imagine altruistic individuals taking into account the
interests of their direct and distant descendants. For those who have good plan-
ning skills  or can aﬀord to hire such skills  this may be a good account of
the bequest/inheritance process (Kopczuk 2007, 2013); often, however, inter-
generational transfers just come about by accident. Whether the planning or
the accident story is a better representation of reality is clearly going to aﬀect
the way in which this distributional mechanism operates as the structure of the
wealth distribution develops over time.
Bequest division
The long-run dynamics of the wealth distribution must be aﬀected by the way
the bequest of generation n is divided amongst the inheritors of generation n+1
7Of course, this version of Chapter 1 is not the only apparently reasonable approach: the
standard account based on well-informed maximising agents has been called into question by
the behavioural-economics literature.
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is crucial. In some cases it is determined by formal legal restrictions (usually
with the objective of equal division) or sometimes by social custom (often with
highly unequal division):8
Unlike the male codﬁsh which, suddenly ﬁnding itself the parent
of three million ﬁve hundred thousand little codﬁsh, cheerfully re-
solves to love them all, the British aristocracy is apt to look with a
somewhat jaundiced eye on its younger sons.9
Clearly economics has things to say on each of these three elements: marriage
partners may be selected for pecuniary advantage as well as for love; strategic
issues may inﬂuence how much is left to posterity and to which members of
posterity. But many of these processes and institutions are commonly seen as
being as being essentially non-economic in nature.
The parts of the wealth-modelling problem described so far apply to isolated
agents  to individuals and to families. These disparate parts need to be brought
together.
The modelling of the behaviour of individual dynasties within society could
be combined with a macroeconomic model that jointly determines the rate of
growth of output and the returns to the productive factors, labour and capital
(Stiglitz 1969, Conlisk 1977, Bourguignon 1981). This then closes the model
since the market return to labour determines the earnings that feature in Chap-
ter 1 of the inheritance story and the ownership of capital appears in the port-
folios of the individual members of the dynasties mentioned in the description
of Chapter 2.
3.4 Assembling the pieces
Without specifying the exact form of any one of the components listed above it
is clear that the combined model could indeed be very complicated.10 So, what
do we do? Here are three ideas:
Numerical simulation. When formulas are too tough for a closed-form solu-
tion it is tempting to use numbers to cut the knot. Too often this approach
leads to mind-numbing reams of tables and not much insight.11
Focus on one feature. A good economist might follow that characteristic economist's
instinct and go back to being a determined little thinker. There is some
8See the discussion of the impact of the French Civil Code contrasted with the earlier
system of primogeniture  Piketty (2014), pages 361-365. Much of the US literature focuses
on bequests as oﬀsetting diﬀerences between children and thus acting as a force promoting
equality  see, for example Becker and Tomes (1979), Menchik (1979), Sheshinski and Weiss
(1982). However Chu (1991) provides an interesting alternative argument for primogeniture
as a rational outcome within families.
9P.G. Wodehouse, The Custody of the Pumpkin.
10Anyone still in doubt might care to glance at Meade (1973), Meade (1976), pages 148-153.
11In contrast Piketty (2014) does this very successfully  see for example Will China Own
the World on pages 460-463.
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merit in this technique, in that it enables one to examine precisely the
impact of a particular model component under the ceteris paribus as-
sumption. However, this is ﬁne for a neat point in a technical journal but
it is not much good for the big picture.12
Big picture. Trying to represent the big-picture view of this complicated pro-
cess might seem at best mere arm waving and at worst not just arm
waving but drowning in a sea of speculation. But it does not have to be.
As Piketty shows, there is a sensible way to carry the academic discourse
forward: to do so one needs to understand the nature of equilibrium in
this context.
4 Equilibrium distribution
The meta-modelling approach enables us to take a closer look at the nature of
the long run. Given a speciﬁc model within the scheme set out in section 3.3
we can characterise a long-term equilibrium. To do this requires some care.
Again use F to denote the distribution function of wealth, but let us make
clear the speciﬁc generation to which the the distribution applies: the wealth
distribution that is present in generation n is given by the function Fn (a snap-
shot of the actual wealth distribution at a given moment in time will depend on
the age distribution as well as Fn ). The meta model can be developed further
to take into account the generational sequence of wealth distributions. Suppose
that the economic mechanisms and institutions present in the two chapters of the
inheritance story set out in section 3 have been precisely speciﬁed: summarise
these as a combined process P that takes a historically pre-existing wealth dis-
tribution in generation n as given and transforms it into another distribution in
generation n+ 1. We can depict this in sketch form as follows:
Fn 7→ P 7→ Fn+1.
The ﬁrst arrow depicts the input to the combined process P and the second
arrow depicts the output from P . Applied recursively this gives a development
story of the way in which the wealth distribution develops through time, here
interpreted as meaning over the generations n = 1, 2, 3, .... This development
story is valid for as long as the process P can reasonably be assumed to re-
main unchanged. For a given process P it may be that that we can ﬁnd some
particular distribution F ∗ that has the following property:
F ∗ 7→ P 7→ F ∗.
If so, then we can call the self-reproducing distribution F ∗ an equilibrium dis-
tribution (see also Piketty 2014, pages 361-366). Clearly the nature of the
equilibrium distribution depends on the process P .
12Piketty himself does this to illuminate speciﬁc issues in his technical contributions to the
literature  see the on-line appendix to Piketty (2014).
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So, in answer to the question what happens in the long run? there broadly
appear to be three possibilities:
1. Convergence to equality. In principle F ∗ is a degenerate distribution with
all the probability mass at the same point.
2. Convergence to inequality. In principle F ∗ is a non-degenerate distribution
with positive inequality. It need not represent a situation of stasis: there
could be mobility with individuals or families who are among the poor
in one generation being among the rich in a later generation; but the
cross-sectional distribution remains the same in perpetuity.
3. Divergence. For the speciﬁed P no such F ∗ exists.
This is a broad-brush picture and needs to be qualiﬁed. First, the in principle
clause in Cases 1 and 2 above is important. Convergence to equality (Case 1)
need not literally mean that in the long run every agent has the same wealth
level or the same income. There may be some noise arising from stochastic
components of individual endowments, variability in tastes or random shocks.13
In the same way, in Case 2 it is an over-simpliﬁcation  although maybe a useful
over-simpliﬁcation  to see the equilibrium wealth distribution consisting just
of permanent structural inequality (Champernowne and Cowell 1998, Cowell
2012); again there may be noise which blurs the otherwise clear picture of rigid
inequality in the long run. Second, Case 3 can take more than one form: there
could be indeﬁnitely increasing inequality as long as P remains unchanged, or
there could be long term ﬂuctuations in the distribution of wealth and income.
What kind of shape would this equilibrium distribution have? There is
a substantial sub-literature that shows how tightly speciﬁed models of wealth
dynamics will in the long run yield an equilibrium that can be characterised as
a familiar functional form, such as the Pareto distribution, mentioned above.14
But it is also quite common to ﬁnd that an interesting story of wealth dynamics
yields an outcome that cannot be easily represented in a standard formula.
However, the absence of a simple formula, the precise shape of the equilibrium
distribution may not be so important: it is sometimes enough to know that an
equilibrium exists and that there is convergence to the equilibrium. Within that
context it may then be possible to discuss the eﬀect of substantial shocks to or
changes in the model environment  wars, depression, technological change  in
order to understand how the equilibrium will change and it may be possible to
understand how policy instruments will aﬀect the equilibrium distribution.
5 The long run and policy
There are only two jokes in economics; neither of them is very funny and one
of them has the punchline assume that there's a can-opener. But in this case,
13Becker and Tomes (1979) provide a general model of the long run which in essence has
this kind of outcome.
14See, for example Wold and Whittle (1957), Champernowne (1973), Champernowne and
Cowell (1998), Cowell (1998), Piketty and Zucman (2014).
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the statement assume that there's an equilibrium is not a ﬂippant aside: the
can-opener provided by the equilibrium distribution device really helps us to
distinguish diﬀerent types of long-run behaviour. The key question about the
long run is not something like how long is the long run? but is long-run
equilibrium the appropriate focus for understanding the nature of economic
inequality and the eﬀect of policy toward inequality?15
Piketty's own primary focus is on the long-run relationship between the rate
of return to capital (r) and the growth rate of output (g). The reason for this is
that if the diﬀerence r− g is positive and the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labour is large then, in long-run equilibrium the share of capital in
total income must be rising.16 Given that capital income (income from wealth)
is more unequally distributed than labour income, this r − g criterion can be
seen as the motor in the process P driving inequality in the long run (Piketty
2014, pages 350-353). he argues that the force generated by the r − g is likely
to be stronger than, say, a policy reform aﬀecting the inheritance transmission
mechanism, such as the introduction of the Napoleonic Civil Code.
But, to my mind, a question of similar magnitude concerns whether or not
P is associated with a long-run equilibrium at all. If it is, then marginal mod-
iﬁcations of a tax on wealth or on the transfers of wealth (in the form of an
inheritance tax) can be expected to nudge the equilibrium in a the direction
desired by the designer of economic policy. If it is not, then the presence or ab-
sence of a governmental redistributive mechanism may be crucial in inﬂuencing
whether there is an explosion of inequality.
So, is the r−g criterion going to become a new mantra of inequality? I hope
not. But the insights provided by Piketty (2014) will certainly become the basis
for serious economic analysis of inequality and associated policy questions.
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